This paper reassesses the link between ICT prices, technology, and productivity. To understand how the ICT sector could come to the rescue of a whole economy, we extend a multi-sector model due to Oulton (2012) to include ICT services (e.g., cloud services) and use it to calibrate the steady-state contribution of the ICT sector to growth in aggregate U.S. labor productivity. Because ICT technologies diffuse through the economy increasingly via purchases of cloud and data analytic services that are not fully accounted for in the standard narrative on ICT's contribution to economic growth, the contribution of ICT to growth in output per hour going forward is found to be substantially larger than generally thought-1.4 percentage points per year. One reason why the estimated contribution is so large is that official ICT asset prices are found to substantially understate the productivity of the sector. The model developed in this paper also has implications for the relationship between prices for ICT services and prices for the capital stocks (i.e., ICT assets) used to supply them. In particular, ICT service prices may diverge from asset prices and capture productivity gains from ICT asset management by the sector.
ICT Prices and ICT Services:
What do they tell us about Productivity and Technology?
The importance of computers, computer microprocessors, and productivity-enhancing computer software in driving the step up in U.S. productivity growth in the mid-1990s is well established. 1 But the Internet and mobile telephony-two of the 20th century's greatest inventions-have been largely absent in the macroeconomic work on U.S productivity performance until recently. Our research on communications technology and communication equipment price measurement (Byrne and Corrado, 2015a,b) and its implications for interpreting U.S. productivity (Corrado, 2011; Corrado and Jäger, 2014 ) puts these innovations front and center and offers a story in which communication and communication networks (as much as computing performance) drove productivity developments in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Communication technology has continued to advance since the early 2000s, and rising connection speeds have made possible the cloud and mobile platforms that are transforming how organizations use computing resources and exploit data. But measured productivity growth has slowed dramatically.
The deterioration in U.S. labor productivity growth is due in part to historically slow real investment in information and communication technology (ICT) equipment and software, which no longer provides an extra boost to overall output per hour. 2 Indeed, not only has nominal ICT equipment and software (E&S) investment relative to GDP moved sideways since 2010 (figure 1a), relative ICT price change has posted extremely small declines of late, after having gradually lost force since 2004 (figure 1b).
Why is ICT investment so weak? And if digital innovations are so transformative, why are they not having a discernible impact on recent ICT prices (and labor productivity)? Google's Hal Varian offers a view from Silicon Valley, namely, that U.S. productivity is mis-measured. 3 Another possibility is that the ICT sector is innovating and prospering but is too small to come to the rescue of an economy facing stiff supply-side headwinds that limit its productivity growth (Gordon, 2014a,b) . As noted elsewhere (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Saunders, 2010) and by our calculations, the value added share of the U.S. ICT-producing sector (including ICT services production) has remained stable at about 6 percent of GDP since 2000, i.e., it has remained relatively small for an extended period of time.
This paper makes, we believe, three contributions that help address this conundrum: First, a multisector growth model developed by Oulton (2012) is extended to include purchased ICT services (e.g., cloud or data analytic services). The amended model shows how ICT can be a driver of growth when ICT investment remains weak and suggests the balanced growth contribution of ICT to U.S. labor productivity growth is very large-1.4 percentage points per year. About 25 percent of this total ICT sector contribution owes to the diffusion of ICT technology via purchases of cloud and related ICT services. 4 Second, the model highlights the channels through which a transition to cloud computing can affect productivity growth and sets out the determinants of ICT services price change during that transition and in balanced growth. The extended model implies and we further posit via a user cost (Jorgenson, 1963) approach that price change for marketed ICT services is proportional to price change for the productive assets used to produce them but that efficiency gains from rising ICT capital utilization may cause ICT services prices to diverge from ICT asset prices.
Third, the paper puts official ICT product prices under a microscope and reviews the consistency of 14 new ICT research price indexes with the model's implications. The new ICT product price indexes are based on our own prior work (Byrne and Corrado, 2015a,b) and new work reported in a companion paper to this paper . They also draw upon the historical ICT price measurement literature (e.g., Rappaport, 2001, 2003) and include prices for cellular and data networking equipment, enterprise software products, high-end computers/servers, PCs, and computer storage systems, which along with a high-speed broadband infrastructure, have spurred the growth of cloud computing, datacenter design services, and data analytics over the last decade.
The companion paper documents how the new ICT product prices are folded into new estimates of national accounts-style investment price indexes that are then used in this paper. The new ICT asset prices suggest that long-term trends in official ICT prices suffer from substantial mismeasurement and that the relative productivity of the ICT sector remains strong and continues to provide an extra kick to labor productivity growth-unlike the implication of figure 1(b). 5 We proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces the model, presents its solution, and discusses its implications for ICT services price change. Section 2 first shows how we measure the ICT vs the nonICT producing sector and reviews selected indicators of ICT technical change, including ICT R&D.
The section also describes how the new ICT era involves technologies delivered as services that raise the utilization of ICT capital, and illustrates the take up of these technologies via purchases of ICT services by the nonICT-producing sector. Section 3 introduces the new ICT research product price indexes and reports and analyzes their implications for assessing ICT services price change and the relative productivity advantage of the ICT sector. Section 3 then uses the implied productivity differential along with Section 2's information on income shares of ICT assets and ICT services to calibrate the model of Section 1. Because the results imply very weak productivity in the nonICT-producing sector, the paper discusses and then concludes with several hypotheses why this is both plausible and likely temporary.
5 As discussed in Byrne, Fernald, and Reinsdorf (2016) , ICT price mismeasurement has been with us for some time, and mismeasurement can only explain a small portion of the "missing output" from the productivity slowdown (see also Syverson 2016) . The ICT equipment prices described in and used in this paper were used in Byrne et al. (2016) , who concluded that mismeasurement of ICT prices cannot explain the recent slowdown in output per hour.
Framework
ICT plays a central role in modern economies, and quantitative assessments of longer-term economic growth prospects depend heavily on estimates of the contribution of ICT to productivity change for the years ahead. Oulton (2012) proposed an approach to making long-term growth projections based on a two-sector model of an open economy where one sector is an ICT-producing/supplying sector. His approach is in the spirit of the growth accounting approach to making economic projections (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2004; Jorgenson and Vu, 2010; The Conference Board, 2015; Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel, 2013) , in which one of the key drivers of economic growth is growth of total factor productivity (TFP) in the ICT-producing sector relative to the rest of the economy.
Benefits to economic growth accrue to faster relative growth of ICT TFP because faster relative ICT TFP growth manifests as faster relative ICT price declines, which then enables faster growth of income and consumption. Oulton's model makes these features of a Jorgenson-style growth projection explicit, along with its corollary that economies with little or no domestic ICT production derive benefits from faster TFP growth in ICT investment goods production elsewhere in the form of improving terms of trade.
To account for the growth of cloud computing, data center design services and data analytics, this paper expands the Oulton model to include intermediate uses of ICT services. The expression for the steady state contribution of ICT to the growth of output per hour in the expanded model is unaffected by assuming a closed economy, as in the original Oulton model. Proceeding with a closed economy assumption for simplicity, the expanded model is set out below.
Expanded two-sector model
Total final demand Y consists of investment (I) and consumption (C) produced in two sectors of the economy. The two producing sectors are (1) an ICT sector (denoted by the subscript T ) and (2) a general business sector excluding ICT producers (denoted by the subscript N ). Each sector produces investment and consumer goods and services for final use. Thus we have
and
where P is the price level, P T and P N are sector prices, and w T represents the relative size of the ICT sector in final demand in nominal terms.
With regard to intermediates, the ICT sector is assumed to supply services for its own intermediate use, as well as for intermediate use by other producers. The general business sector is assumed to produce intermediates for its own use only; these intermediates are omitted from its production function to keep the exposition simple. 6 With sector N producing for final demand only, and each sector's output (production net of own use) denoted by Q T and Q N , respectively, sectoral production may be written in terms of the following outputs and inputs:
where K j i denotes sector j's capital input from its stock of investment goods of type i (i = T, N ) and
worked in the sector, and h is a labor composition index applicable to the economy as a whole.
The value of each sector's factor payments is given by
with relevant factor shares given by
In equation (4), R N and R T are the nominal rental prices of capital and W is the hourly wage, and in (5), v K T and v L are the shares of ICT capital and labor in total income, respectively, and ζ N T is ICT business services purchased by sector N relative to total income in the economy.
The model assumes there is faster technical progress in the ICT sector. Denoting the rate of growth in the Hicksian shifter (A i ) in the sectoral production functions (3) as µ i , this assumption is expressed as µ T > µ N . A major simplifying assumption is then employed to solve the model, namely, that the sectoral production functions exhibit constant returns and differ only by their A i terms. This implies 6 The complications of chain weighting also are ignored.
factor shares and input quantities are the same in both sectors, in which case log differentiation of the factor payments equations (4) yields the result shown by Oulton that relative ICT price change equals (the negative of) relative ICT TFP growth. Defining the relative ICT price as p = P T /P N , this result is expressed as a steady-state rate of change in relative pricesṗ given bẏ
As may be seen, relative ICT price change is negative, reflecting the extent to which the relative growth of productivity in the ICT sector exceeds the growth of productivity elsewhere in an economy.
The expanded model's solution for the contribution of ICT to the growth in GDP per hour (ȮP H) is given by Contribution of ICT sector toȮP H = (7)
Investment (use) and productivity (diffusion) effects
For details of this solution, see appendix A1. Equation (7) differs from the solution to the original Oulton model due to the presence of the term ζ N T capturing the ICT services-using intensity of the economy. The solution nonetheless aligns with the usual growth accounting approach in which the contribution of ICT capital to growth in output per hour is identified as flowing through two channels:
ICT use and ICT production. It is typical to consider the ICT use effect as operating through services provided by producers' own investment in ICT capital, i.e., via services generated by ICT assets that producers own themselves. In the expanded model, the channel also operates via nonICT producers' purchases of ICT capital services, e.g., purchases of cloud services, that provide workers access to ICT technologies in essentially the same way. 7
In steady-state growth, output and output per hour in the N sector grow less rapidly than output and output per hour in the T sector, the sector producing ICT goods and services. In fact, this growth 7 The contribution to productivity growth is particularly powerful when ICT services are domestically produced-i.e., the effect shown in equation (7) includes the industry's contribution to TFP growth via the standard Domar-Hulten channel whereby innovation in upstream industries has impacts on aggregate TFP growth via using industries. When purchased ICT services are imported, the technology diffusion channel (i.e, their capital deepening-like effect) is still there, but its salutary impact is partially offset by the negative effect of ICT services imports on wT . Appendix A1 sets out the formula for the Domar-Hulten contribution of the ICT sector to TFP growth in the ICT-services amended model. differential is −ṗ, a result that follows from equality of the marginal product of factors used in the two sectors, which follows from the assumption of perfect competition; see appendix A1 for further details.
The model thus implies that, to the extent µ T really is greater than µ N , real ICT services prices fall (as they are on par with real ICT asset prices), and real ICT services output growth is faster than growth of real output of the general production sector, evidence for which shall be shown in section 3 below.
ICT services prices vs. ICT asset prices
The ICT sector's output price is a single price P T by assumption in a two-sector model. The strictness of this assumption may be readily relaxed, however, yielding the usual multiple sector framework with many relative prices and an aggregate production possibilities frontier that generates multiple types of C and I for final use (e.g., Jorgenson 1966; Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 2005) . In what follows, the user cost expression is used to set out the conditions under which a multiple sector framework generates essentially the same implication for ICT services prices as did the simple two-sector model.
Consider the determinants of prices for two types of ICT services in a multiple sector setting. The first is where ICT services production is highly ICT-capital intensive, as in the production of "public" cloud services by the ICT sector for sale to the nonICT-producing sector (e.g., Amazon selling to GM).
The second is where ICT services are for designing "private" cloud services facilities within firms in the nonICT producing sector. In both cases, ICT services facilitate more efficient sharing of datacenter resources across users.
T is the value of ICT services, where P S T is a quality-adjusted price specific to each type of service. P I T will denote the quality-adjusted price of ICT assets relevant to each case (i.e., it is an investment price index). These prices are expressed below as real prices p S T , p I T , relative to, say, the PCE or GDP deflator, below. A steady state required real rate of return on assets ρ is defined consistently (i.e., the price change element is in the same relative terms).
Case 1. Cloud providers deliver infrastructure, platforms, and software as a service. In this case,
ICT services prices are per period charges for resources managed by the cloud provider. Assume that these services are priced as capital services provided to a capital owner and equal to a rental price times the capital stock and a factor of proportionality:
The expression in brackets is the standard expression for capital services and λ is a factor of proportionality representing the efficiency of ICT service provision relative to in-house ICT. As previously indicated, ρ is the real net return to capital investment; δ T is the depreciation rate of ICT capital. 8 ρ is constant in steady state growth by definition, and δ T is constant by assumption. Thus, if the real price of cloud services p S T is falling rapidly in constant quality terms, equation (8) suggests that the driver of that change is either falling real prices of ICT investment goods p I T or rising efficiency (falling
Under what conditions might λ fall? One possibility is increasing returns, e.g., if ICT assets were more or less a large fixed cost that substantially inflated average costs relative to marginal costs (a huge server farm, say). Increased utilization of the relevant assets leads to declines in average costs, and if such declines are passed on to customers, declines in p S T exceed those for p I T until steady state growth is achieved. 9 In other words, from (8) we then havė
where, note,ṗ S T ,ṗ I T , andλ T are all < 0.λ T reflects the drop in underutilization, which augments declines in cloud services prices relative to declines in prices of ICT assets according to equation (9) . 10 Cloud services prices that fall less than ICT asset prices suggest providers are retaining the efficiency gains for themselves.
8 Appendix A1 sets out the four real rental prices in the two-sector model in a no-tax world where the terms in the nominal interest rate and the relevant relative asset price change are summarized by ρ.
9 Note that equation (8) did not suggest or specify that ρ exhausted observed capital income, which is to say the nominal interest rate in ρ is an ex ante rate. As shown by Berndt and Fuss (1986) , the marginal product of capital varies directly with capital utilization and is absorbed in capital income and attributed to capital rental prices only when ex post calculated rates of return are used.
10 To see this, let λT vary with capital utilization, e.g., as in λT = 1 − d where d is a measure of the underutilization of ICT assets (and can be calculated so as to exhaust capital income). Equation (8) then suggests that improvements in the utilization of ICT capital assets in the public cloud services-producing industry introduce a wedgeλT between changes in observed prices for cloud services and prices for ICT assets. Such wedges presumably surface for only periods of time, as changes in utilization usually are a temporary phenomenon.
Case 2. System design services are purchased to improve the flow of ICT services produced within firms, and the services price is a fee proportional to the services-induced volume improvement in ownproduced ICT services. 11 System design services may then be modeled as an increase in the efficiency of installed ICT asset stocks, an approach relevant to the spread and adoption of cloud technology, i.e., as in designing and installing a "private" cloud with significant server consolidation.
Note first that the real price of ICT capital services r N T and ICT capital owned within the nonICT producing sector K N T are the subjects of analysis, and that
is the real income attributed to nonICT producers' deployment of ICT capital. Consider next that producers will pay for system design services up to the point where fees do not exceed the present discounted value of per period benefits provided. Let α denote the proportional fee and −λ N the proportional improvement in r N T that is provided. 12 Ignoring discounting, the effective decline in real ICT asset prices faced by nonICT producers using system design servicesṗ eI T is given bẏ
and industry revenues are expressed as
Equation (10) suggests that ICT capital packs an extra punch to nonICT producers' productivity, as the effective growth in real services will exceed real growth in stocks due to increases in utilization of the stocks. Equation (11) suggests that ICT services will grow relative to ICT capital income when substantial improvements are being made by providers (and the improvements they make are long-lived, not shown).
All told, theλ's represent efficiencies enjoyed by companies that move from a traditional IT datacenter to a cloud computing platform; for new firms, efficiencies represent lower capital required to start a business. Combined, these efficiencies have the potential to be large because cloud computing refers not only to shifts in workload location (from on-premises environments to the public cloud) but also to increased take up of cloud technologies within firms that result in much denser workload-to-ICT capital ratios.
Quality change or productive externality?
From a macroeconomic point of view, increased demand for cloud computing leads to decreased demand for computing hardware (for a given volume of ICT services) and increased demand for the software developers and software products that enable machine virtualization and application containerization. 13
Over time, the associated extra kick in effective ICT price declines implied by equation 10 would lead to greater computerization/digitization of an economy, which would then translate into a restoration of the share of computer hardware in the mix of ICT investment in the longer run. With regard to communication equipment, although high-speed broadband is a fundamental enabler of cloud services, we have not identified first order impacts of virtualization and its associated efficiencies on the demand for communication equipment beyond the fundamental need to support datacenter IP traffic.
Before we go further, let us underscore that the server, storage, software product and computing services prices developed and used in section 3 of this paper do not treat the application workload of IT capital, or the capability of software products or systems design services to enable cloud computing, as quality change. The macroeconomic impact of the adoption of cloud technology is via its contribution to productivity growth, as in network externalities (or spillovers to ICT capital in general). Cost savings due to virtualization, whether they accrue to cloud providers or to nonICT producers, thus are viewed as productive externalities. 14 While this position is parallel to treating the productivityenhancing impacts of Internet platform business models as a (network) externality, virtualization as a computing technology is similar to multiplexing in communication where more and more signals are transmitted over physical networks (or spectrum), and where, to the extent possible, increases in capacity are built into quality-adjusted price indexes such as those developed for communications equipment in Byrne and Corrado (2015a,b) . The adjustment of prices of servers, storage, systems software, and systems design services to consistently account for efficiencies due to virtualization and related cloud technologies is a similar challenge, but one well beyond the scope of this paper.
13 These technologies are discussed below, in section 2.1. 14 This is not to suggest that these effects cannot be isolated and quantified, as they have been in work that adds a separate channel to decompositions such as equation (7) to account for ICT to contributions to productivity growth beyond the direct capital contributions captured in growth accounting. For example, Corrado (2011) and Corrado and Jäger (2014) showed that network externalities were a noteworthy contributor to productivity growth in the United States and 8 major European countries during the Internet and wireless network expansion in the first half of the 2000s. Beyond broadband, however, spillovers to ICT have not been found in macro or industry-level data (Stiroh, 2002) , despite a large micro-based literature suggesting externalities to IT use by individual firms. See Corrado and van Ark (2016) for further discussion. Other computer related services Intermediate 5415
Note: (pt) after an industry codes denotes that not all of the industry consists of the component being described.
ICT sector trends
Columns 1 and 2 of table 1 define the empirical counterpart to sector T of the previous section. Column
(1) is what we strive to measure, and column (2) indicates how close we come to achieving that using BEA's annual Input-Output and Final Uses data.
Using data for the T sector so defined, this section has three subsections that do the following: 
Technology and R&D
Internet and wireless technologies. Faster relative growth of TFP in ICT production is usually attributed to the relatively rapid pace of advances in computing and semiconductor technology, espe-cially in the speed of microprocessors (MPUs) used in computers (Jorgenson, 2001 )-and, according to many accounts, such advances stepped down a notch in the first half-decade of the 2000s (Hilbert and López, 2011; Pillai, 2011 Pillai, , 2013 . By contrast, advances in communications technology, i.e., internet and wireless technologies, continue at a similar pace (Byrne and Corrado, 2015a,b) . (Greenstein, 2000, p. 391) , who was describing internet technology. 16 The calculations are based on the historical data and 2015 estimate reported in issues of Cisco's Visual Networking Index and Global Mobile Data Forecast Update.
17 The sources for these forecasts are Boston Consulting Group (http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/ g-20s-internet-economy-is-set-reach-42-trillion-2016-up-from-23-trillion-2010-as-nearly-1611718.htm), continuation of the demand for mobility and hotspots cannot be realized without continued, rapid increases in communications capacity, especially wireless capacity. The panel on the right of figure 2 shows that by one measure (the rate at which wireless-related telecommunications patents are granted in the United States), the current pace of change in communications technology is more rapid than it was in the late 1990s.
Cloud technologies. Cloud service providers supply ICT resources over the internet. 18 Services range from simple data storage to full provision of software for "business intelligence" applications. Access is as ubiquitous as wireless and wireline networks. The feasibility and affordability of cloud services is the capstone of an ongoing series of networking innovations that have raised access speeds, lowered storage costs, and perhaps most importantly, enabled seamless and invisible sharing of computing resources across users.
Cloud computing involves three major technologies that raise the utilization of computer resources and speed software development: virtualization, grid computing and containerization. "Virtualization" provides each user with a distinct virtual machine with its own operating system kernel but allocates resources from actual individual machines to multiple users, enabling higher resource utilization in the data center. A complete history is beyond the scope of this paper, but virtualization has its roots in IBM mainframes of the 1970s, preceded by time sharing (simultaneous use of the same computer by multiple jobs) and complemented by grid computing (applying the resources of many computers in a network to a single job 19 ). More recently "containerization" technology has allowed multiple platform environments to operate on the same virtual machine, increasing the speed of application development, deployment, and scalability.
As shown in figure 3(a), the increase in spending for capacity expansion among major cloud vendors has been stunning: Nominal capital expenditures at Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Apple increased 25 percent per year between 2003:Q1 and 2017:Q2. Firms that transition from traditional datacenters to a cloud platform (private or public) enjoy substantial hardware consolidation and cost savings. IT Gartner (http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2636073), and Cisco's Global Cloud Index (2013-2018) (http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/service-provider/global-cloud-index-gci/index.html).
18 According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, "cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction" (Mell and Grance, 2011) .
19 Grid computing was first used in 1989 to link supercomputers and thereafter grew and evolved along with the Internet (De Roure, David, et al. 2003) . Private demand for data processing, hosting, and related information services (NAICS 5182, 51913) and for computer systems design services and related computer services (NAICS 54152,3,9) rose sharply relative to GDP in the United States in recent years (the solid blue shaded areas of the left and right panels of figure 5, respectively). These developments reflect both the growth of cloud services (which are in NAICS 5182 and has seen steady growth) and a remarkable surge in systems design services that likely also owes to the demand for cloud-based IT systems to the extent that systems design services are co-investments with the demand for cloud computing. 23 All told, the analysis in section 1
suggested that the relative growth of ICT services industries would be strong if there were real gains to reconfiguring IT departments to capture cost savings due to cloud technologies. The prospective cost savings, along with a growing demand for data analytics and revenue momentum of the "subscription"
23 To be clear, spending on computer systems design is not counted as investment in national accounts even though in principle it would be included in expanded frameworks that recognize a portion of consulting services as long-lived investment in new business process design (e.g., as in Sichel 2005, 2009 Within new software assets, purchases of marketed, standardized (prepackaged) software products are about 1/3 of total software, as illustrated by the dark blue shaded area in the right panel of figure   7 . The lion's share of software is custom produced, whether as purchased services or performed on own account. Price measures for these custom components do not exist (i.e., BLS does not produce prices indexes for NAICS 541511, or any part of 5415 for that matter); the BEA estimates them based in part on its price index for prepackaged software products. The companion paper reviews these prices, but suffice it to say BEA's price indexes for software investment fall 2 percent per year, not the 15 to 20 percent that high-tech equipment prices do. All told, the dramatic shift in overall ICT investment from computing equipment toward software illustrated in figure 7 suggests that the rate of overall ICT investment price change should have slowed over time. The inclusion of digital entertainment services in ICT final output raises the question of whether investments in digital entertainment originals (EO) should also be considered part of ICT final outputand correspondingly, how to treat R&D investments in ICT. Our thinking is that EO assets are more akin to software assets than to the software original that is used to produce the software assets. The purchasers of software assets (software products) use the assets to generate (ICT) services for a pe- ICT income and services shares Consider now the shares defined in equation (5) Capital income is the nominal value of the flow of services provided by capital assets owned and used in production, and it is typical to regard v K T as a basic indicator of the extent to which ICT has diffused via use in production in an economy. ICT business services also are inputs to production but may be marketed versions of the same services provided via direct ownership of ICT capital. As may be seen, the trajectory of the total income generated by the use of ICT capital assets in the U.S. economy changes rather dramatically with the inclusion of marketed services, suggesting that v K T , alone, is an Source: Authors' elaboration of capital and labor income data from U.S. BLS productivity major sector and total economy systems and U.S. BEA input-output data. BLS capital income for software was adjusted to exclude software products R&D.
insufficient indicator of ICT use in production. The right panel plots the capital income share relative to the labor share (a ratio of the compensations for ICT capital and labor). This combination of parameters is applied to the ICT productivity differential captured by the steady state rate of decline in real ICT asset prices (or effective asset prices) to determine the contribution of the ICT "use and diffusion" effect to OPH growth. The parameter combination averages 11.3 percent for the past 10 years, considerably higher than the 7.7 percent share implied by ICT capital ownership alone.
ICT investment prices
Accurate ICT asset prices are required for the quantitative evaluation of equation (7). The strategy in this section is to present newly developed ICT product price measures, confirm their alignment with the trends in technology and R&D discussed in the previous section, and contrast them where relevant to official statistics. Then we examine new ICT investment research price indexes built from the new product price indexes.
The new product price indexes reflect work that either (a) was conducted by the authors as part of Copeland (2013); Byrne and Corrado (2015a) . Further information on the sources and methods used to construct the new ICT product and investment price indexes are in our companion paper . shown. Four are price indexes for the telecom products newly developed and analyzed in Byrne and Corrado (2015a,b) ; the computer storage device index was introduced in Byrne (2015) . The remainder are price indexes newly developed for this paper and whose construction is discussed in the companion paper. Of these, the indexes for servers, enterprise software, enterprise wireline telecom services, along with telecom products, are particularly relevant for understanding developments in the last decade.
New ICT product prices and implications for ICT services prices
The following observations emerge from table 2: First, prices for telecom equipment products (lines 1 to 4) fall relatively rapidly-between 12 and about 18 percent per year during the last decade (column 2). Although these are noteworthy rates of decline-especially for cellular networking equipment, the circled item in column 2-they are slower than price declines estimated for computing equipment (lines (Byrne, 2015) . Finally, and by contrast, prices for enterprise and other software products (which includes systems software as well as application software) maintained relatively strong declines through the most recent period (the circled items in line 10). 26
From equation (9), prices for cloud computing and storage services are closely tied to the asset prices just discussed. However, imperfect competition and other fixed costs (in the form of nonICT assets) create potential for these prices to deviate from the prices of the underlying ICT assets. Services of nonICT capital assets (including land) are not an appreciable fraction of total capital income in the information processing services industry (16 percent), which includes cloud computing and storage 15, 23, 24 and 26, using McCallum (2002) and Byrne (2015) to inform line 6; Rappaport (2001, 2003) to inform line 7; Abel et al. (2007) and Copeland (2013) to inform line 9; Gordon (1990) to inform line 14; and Grimm (1998), Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2015) .
The various results considered are on par or slightly faster than the results of the price index for enterprise software (line 10); the results are similar to the price indexes for the relevant telecom equipment (lines 1 and 2) and somewhat below the relevant computing equipment prices (lines 5 and 6). These comparative results suggest that the aggregate ICT asset price index might be a reasonable proxy for ICT services price change, consistent with the model and analysis in section 1.
New ICT Investment Prices
To assess the macroeconomic implications of the ICT goods and services prices just discussed, the indexes must be folded into national accounts-style investment price indexes. Detailed components of 27 NonICT capital income asset shares are derived from the detailed capital measures for the NAICS 515,7 and NAICS 518,9 industries from 2004 and 2014 as reflected in the BLS MFP database (accessed July 1, 2016).
28 In March, 2014, Google announced price cuts for "virtually all" its cloud computing and storage services of 30 percent, only to be followed in May, 2015, by further cuts in the 20 to 30 percent range (see Lardinois, h 25; Yegulalp, y 18) . the investment price indexes are reported in the appendix to this paper (table A1, terms of component contributions to real ICT price change (lines 5 to 7), the contribution of software from 1994 on is particularly noteworthy and owes, in part, to its growing share. But all told, in terms of differences relative to BEA (lines 9 to 11), all three components make similar contributions to the estimated nearly 6 percentage point per year understatement of overall ICT price declines in recent years (column 6). 
1. ICT investment -9.5 -12.7 -9.9 -14.1 -11.3 -8.9 2.
Communications equipment -4.5 -9.4 -10.5 -10.7 -9.9 -11.0 3.
Computers Figure 11 updates the picture of real ICT price change in figure 1(b) to include the new estimate reported on line 1 of table 3. According to the new estimate real ICT price change is still estimated to have gradually lost force in recent years, but to a point that leaves the current pace of change in strongly negative territory. From a macroeconomic perspective as highlighted by the two-sector model, this is the crucial result for continuing to regard ICT-either via investment, purchased services, or production-as a driver of economic growth in the future. Figure 11 further suggests that the newly estimated pace of real ICT price change from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s was extraordinary, and the experience likely is a poor indicator of relative ICT productivity going forward.
Implications
A calibration of the solution to the two-sector model set out in equation (7) based on parameters drawn from the most recent ten-year period implies a still large contribution of ICT to output per hour growth-1.4 percentage points per year. This of course assumes that these parameters are reasonable, which we shall detail in a moment. Regarding the assumption of balanced growth, empirics will be sensitive to the actual over-the-period changes in factor utilization and/or the cost of capital from 2004 to 2014, and these changed little on balance. 29 The balanced growth assumption is in this sense The memo items in table 4 shed light on why our calculation of the ICT contribution is so high.
There are three reasons. First, the conventionally calculated contribution of ICT to labor productivity growth (i.e., via capital spending per worker) does not factor in business use of cloud computing; nor 
1.
Total ICT 1.8 1.4 of which: 2.
ICT use and diffusion effect 1.2 1.1 Notes-Contributions are based on equation ( does it factor in purchases of ICT consulting services that capture design services for private clouds, and possibly data analytics and related AI services. Collectively, we call this the "ICT diffusion effect." The channel is estimated to be .4 percentage points per year (after rounding) and is measured by an appropriate weight times the relative ICT productivity differential. A second reason why our calculation is of the ICT contribution is high is our inclusion of EO capital, which is worth .2 percentage points per year (after rounding). Together these sum to a tidy .5 percentage points per year.
The third reason for our large estimated ICT contribution is the new estimates of ICT price change that imply that the growth rate of output per hour would be higher by . been enjoyed by the adoption of cloud platforms. 33 And figure 13 suggests that the failure of nonICT producers to reap productivity gains did not owe to a lack of co-investments in the intangible assets that are especially crucial during the installation phase of new ICT platforms, e.g., investments in business process change and employer-specific training (Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang, 2002) .
It is unclear why industries whose usage of ICT services increased the most after 2007 had weaker (or no greater) rates of change in productivity from 2010 to 2013 relative to prior performance despite their co-investments in ICT-related intangibles, but several possibilities are likely. First, the very swift pace of change in the ICT sector may have created adjustment costs that temporarily offset gains from adapting to the rapid pace of digital innovation. 34 Second, it is possible some ICT spending may be defensive, e.g., in cyber security. Third, the Great Recession may have induced firms to "pull forward" their plans to adopt cloud-based ICT systems, and the savings from doing so may have only staunched losses that were particularly severe among adopters. All told, the "diffusion" portion of the model's "use and diffusion" effect of 1.1 percentage points per year contribution of ICT to labor productivity growth seems to have not only shut down, but may even be temporarily generating negative productivity spillovers. Because it is common, even fundamental, to regard innovation in upstream sectors as diffusing to downstream sectors through intermediate use, and there is no reason to believe that this channel will not return in full force in the years ahead.
Summary and conclusion
This paper set out a two-sector model that illustrated how the ICT sector can have an out-sized influence on economic growth via its relative productivity growth; the model, originally due to Oulton (2012), was expanded to include ICT services for improved relevancy. A central feature of the model is that relative ICT asset prices reflect the relative productivity of the sector. Official measures of ICT prices suggest that the relative productivity of ICT capital has been gradually eroding for 10 years and that its current advantage is close to nil. This paper found no evidence in support of this central implication of the current official ICT price measures.
The paper first found that ICT R&D has not only been well-maintained, but that software products R&D has enjoying a stunning rise. If technical change in the ICT sector has ground to a halt, then 33 Although this paper has shown a disturbing degree of price mismeasurement that would feed directly into the TFP estimates plotted in this figure, these concerns are somewhat ameliorated because the figure uses changes in the rate of productivity growth (i.e., double differences) and examines nonICT-producing industries only. 34 Adjustment costs were used to analyze the Solow paradox and step-up in productivity growth in the 1990s (e.g., Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997; Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro, 2001; Hall, 2001; Kiley, 2001) . the return to software R&D must have fallen dramatically, which seems unlikely in the face of more than a decade of relative growth in investments in this area and the advent of cloud technologies that should have boosted productivity in the conduct of software R&D. Second, the model developed in this paper predicted strong growth in ICT services use and strong relative growth of ICT design services to the extent that cloud technologies has taken hold. The overt, first order macroeconomic effects of the transition to cloud technologies-weak computer hardware demand and increase in ICT capital utilization-are not easy to detect in macrodata. But strong relative growth in cloud services and systems design services (i.e., relative to GDP) is a key feature of the current ICT landscape and one sign that innovation is still driving the sector. All told, via the user cost relationship as well as the paper's two-sector model, we also found that ICT services price change is driven by ICT asset price change; the alternative ICT asset price change measures reported in this paper-especially the 26 percent annual decline in real prices for servers and storage equipment (15 and 21 percentage points faster, respectively, than drops in official prices for these assets; see again table 2)-are consistent with press reports that suggest prices for cloud services are dropping rapidly.
More broadly, the paper introduced new measures for ICT asset price change that incorporated available research as well as new work conducted expressly for this paper. The ICT asset price measures were based on more than a dozen new ICT product price indexes, and the new ICT investment price indexes for communication equipment, computers, and software were developed to be as coherent as possible with national accounts practices. The new results feature substantial innovations for total telecom equipment, computer servers, software products, and enterprise telecom services (wireline).
Although much new evidence on ICT asset prices and ICT services prices was marshaled for the analysis reported in this paper, large gaps in evidence remain-enterprise software products and differentiated computer design services are notable examples of these holes. The paper's primary conclusion that real ICT price declines remain squarely in negative territory suggests that the sector will continue to deliver an out-sized contribution to growth in output per hour-1.4 percentage points per year in balanced growth. This figure is substantial in light of historical average OPH growth of 2 percent, but it emerges from two sources documented in this paper: first, an ICT income share that has continued to expand along with the relative growth of ICT services, and second, a rate of real ICT price change that has declined more than 10 percent per year since 1959 and currently is understated by nearly 6 percentage points. Although the current weakness in output per hour growth owes at least in part to headwinds unrelated to ICT, correlations in the available industrylevel data show that total factor productivity in nonICT producing industries has not been improving along with increased ICT services use. Additional research is needed to deepen our understanding of the linkages between measured productivity, firm performance and firm spending on ICT assets and ICT services. 
The functions for the two sectors are identical except for TFP (the Hicksian shifter) whose growth rates µ T and µ N are exogenous.
The supply-use equations for the open economy version of the model are
Imports M = M C + M I are imports of ICT goods, and exports X = X C + X I are exports of all other goods, i.e, the economy is an (net) importer of ICT and a (net) exporter of all other types of output. Next, we assume input supplies must equal demands, so that H = H N + H T and K i = j K j i , j = T, N ; i = T, N . Accumulation equations are given bẏ
Recalling that p = P T /P N , a steady state in this model is when trade is balanced X = pM and when the real interest rate r and proportions of total hours allocated to each sector H i /H (i = T, N ) are constant. With sectoral hours shares constant in steady state growth, for sectoral and overall output per hour to grow at a constant rate it follows that the services share of ICT production must also be constant. This follows from the definitions:
where in the steady state, the growth rate Q N and Y N (and thus q n and y n ) are identical by definition. The growth rate of Q T is a (constant) share-weighted average of the growth rates of Y T and S N T , which grow at the same rate, and thus implyq T =ẏ T in steady growth.
Note also that with sectoral hours shares constant in steady state growth, output-per-hour (OPH) growth in the total economy is a share-weighted average of the growth rates of OPH growth in each of the sectors, i.e., accounting for "labor reallocation" due to shifts in hours shares is not needed.
Growth rate of relative ICT prices (ṗ). Given the model's assumption that production functions are the same up to a scalar multiple, it is easy to see that the rate of change in relative ICT pricesṗ (where recall p = P T P N ) is given byṗ = µ N − µ T < 0 (A7) Equation A7 is proved by total differentiation of the payments equations, text equation (4), with respect to time. With µ N and µ T constant by assumption, so too isṗ.
Growth rate of output per hour. To obtain the steady state growth rates of labor productivity, first differentiate equation (A1) where i is the nominal rate of interest and the real interest rate is the nominal rate minus the growth rate of the N sector price P N , expressed in terms of the relative price p in (A11).
In steady state where the real interest rate is constant and factors are paid their marginal products, the solutions for sector N are thenq * Consider now the T sector. Equality of the real marginal product of ICT capital in T sector production with real user cost implies
Because the left hand side of (A14) is constant, it follows thatq T =k T T from which it follows:
In steady state growth, output per hour in sector T grows faster than output per hour in sector N . and subsitituting (A20) into this expression and combining terms yields our final result, an expression for the contribution of the ICT sector to total OPH growth:
Contribution of ICT to total OPH growth (A23)
The final term in equation (A23) appears as text equation (7) where β, γ, (1 − α − β − γ), and ω T are replaced by their empirical counterparts v K T , ζ N T , v L , and w T .
Contribution of ICT to growth in TFP The amended model's solution for aggregate TFP µ also is different than that implied by the original Oulton model. Under the usual neoclassical growth accounting assumptions in the presence of intermediates (e.g., Hulten 1978) , the growth of aggregate TFP is the sum of the growth of each sector's TFP growth times its Domar-Hulten weight, which is the ratio of each sector's sectoral production (gross output net of own use) to aggregate value added, P i Q i /P Y . From (2) and (5), these weights are expressed as:
whose sum is greater than one by the relative size of ICT services supplied to nonICT producers.
The growth of aggregate TFP µ is then given by
The contribution of the ICT sector to overall TFP growth is larger than the sector's share in final demand w T to account for the diffusion of the sector's innovation via use of ICT services (intermediate inputs) by other producers in the economy.
A2 Nominal ICT investment deflators
The table below shows detailed components of the nominal national accounts-style price deflators calculated for the analysis in this paper. The methods used to construct these deflators are described in detail in our companion paper . Other equipment -9.0 -9.3 -3.3 -8.8 -5.4 -2.0 10.
Capitalized services --2.0 -2.2 -3.1 -1.5 -2.6 11. Software -1.0 -4.4 -3.9 -5.5 -3.5 -4.1 12.
Prepackaged -9.8 -9.0 -7.0 -9.6 -6.8 -7.2 13.
Custom and own-account .0 -2.0 -2.2 -3.1 -1.5 -2.6
Memos: 14. ICT excluding PCs -4.5 -8.4 -6.5 -9.9 -6.6 -6.4 15.
Computers excluding 16. BEA ICT -2.7 -6.4 -2.1 -7.5 -3.3 -1.4 17. BEA ICT excluding PCs -2.6 -4.5 -1.4 -5.2 -1.9 -1.2 18.
Computers excluding PCs -16.6 -11.0 -3.6 -12.7 -6.6 -1.8
Note: Figures reported as "BEA" are authors' calculations based on BEA data.
